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SPECIALLY TAILORED LEGAL SERVICES
FOR LOW-INCOME PERSONS IN THE AGE
OF WEALTH INEQUALITY:
PRAGMATISM OR CAPITULATION?
Lucie White*
The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard.1
INTRODUCTIONO NE of the major themes of this conference is whether the legal
services society provides for low-income people and groups
should be the same or different than the legal services that are
purchased by high-income clients. The conference directs this ques-
tion to the statutes, ethical rules, and practice standards that regulate
the kind of legal services that low-income clients are entitled to re-
ceive. It also directs this question to the institutions for funding, dis-
tributing, and monitoring those services. Should we seek more
creative and flexible ways for tailoring legal services for low-income
persons to the particular capacities and circumstances of low-income
clients, in this climate of groving income and wealth inequality? Or,
is this proposal itself a symptom, rather than a solution, to that widen-
ing inequality?
The debate over how to provide and fund legal services to indigent
clients is as old as the legal profession itself. But the character and
intensity of that debate has varied across time. In the United States,
this debate has heated up during periods of crisis and transformation
in the American welfare state, such as the Progressive Era, the New
Deal, and the War on Poverty/Great Society era. In each of those
periods, the debate over legal services has been embedded in a larger
contest over the normative foundations and institutional practices that
shape the welfare state.2 The United States and the other highly de-
veloped industrial nations are currently in the midst of a fourth period
of crisis and change in the norms and institutions of their welfare
states. The suggestion that I want to pose in this short essay is that the
current debate over legal services for low-income persons is best un-
derstood in the context of this wider contest. The broad question that
this contest poses is about the state's proper role in the distribution of
societal wealth and the provision of basic human needs.
* Louis A. Horvitz Professor of Law. Harvard Law School.
1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254. 268-69 (1970).
2. See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capi-
talism, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 474, 607-15 (1985).
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The current crisis in industrial welfare states has been studied
widely.3 Nonetheless, the sources of that crisis are highly contested
and poorly understood. Many commentators agree that a cluster of
emerging, interacting, and ideologically-contested historical forces-
technology, legal and institutional arrangements, culture, macro-econ-
omies, and the like-have converged to pose a deep political and cul-
tural challenge to the institutions and practices that have
characterized advanced industrial welfare states. This cluster of forces
has produced three broad trends.
The first of these trends is a widening gap in wealth and income
between the highest and lowest income groups.4 This gap has had the
effect of driving a wedge between the interests of politically and eco-
nomically powerful elites and the disfranchised groups at the bottom
of the wealth/income scale.5 The second trend is widespread rejec-
tion, among both elites and mass public opinion, of direct state redis-
tribution and social spending as the best means of countering this
wealth/income gap.6 This trend reflects the broad societal acceptance
of two related tenets of neo-liberal political and economic theory: (1)
that a lean government, one that can overcome the liberal addiction to
"taxing and spending," is the best engine for the generation of societal
wealth; and (2) that an unfettered "free market," which protects indi-
vidual property against government taxing or taking, is the best mech-
anism for its equitable distribution.7 The third trend is a widespread
disillusionment, among intellectual elites as well as wider publics, with
bureaucratic institutional arrangements in any setting, and particularly
with using state bureaucracies to deliver social services such as educa-
tion, housing, health care, and legal assistance.8
These three trends-a growing wealth gap; an increasing reluctance
to use the state's taxing or regulatory power to shape the market or
distribute wealth; and an increasing disillusionment with state social
service bureaucracies-have set the scene for the current period of
challenge and transformation of the United States welfare state. In-
deed, over the last decade, we have been swept into that process. We
3. See generally Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense:
Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition 250-378 (1995) (acknowledg-
ing the overwhelming complexity of studying transnational legal fields and proposing
a new research agenda); Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents at xix-xxxvi
(1998) (analyzing new politics within the global city and the voice marginalized peo-
ple have within this system).
4. See Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz, Rising Wage Inequality: The
United States vs. Other Advanced Countries, in Working Under Different Rules 29-56
(Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994).
5. See Sassen, supra note 3, at xxv-xxvii.
6. See, e.g., de Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 82-90 (discussing how the "promise
of a fairer distribution of social benefits . . . has not been sustained and is being
eroded").
7. See id.
8. See id.
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have watched this challenge focus upon the most vulnerable welfare
state program: Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"),
which was put in place in the Progressive and New Deal eras, and
expanded into an equal access entitlement program during the 1960s.1
This challenge culminated in August 1996, with the repeal of the sixty-
year-old AFDC entitlement, through the enactment of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act ("PRWORA"), a new fed-
eral welfare reform law.10
As we all know, this law disestablished the federal AFDC program
and devolved much of the legal authority for the block grants that
replaced the AFDC entitlement to the discretion of state and local
officials." Further, it authorized private sector for-profit, charitable,
and religious institutions to replace state bureaucracies in the delivery
of welfare services to the poor.12 The likely effect of these changes
will be to exacerbate the gap of income and resources between well-
to-do elites and the extremely disfranchised groups that AFDC serves.
Can the wider context that the enactment of PRWORA signals-of
crisis and transformation in the foundational premises of the Ameri-
can welfare state itself-give us any new purchase on the perennial
questions about the delivery of legal services that are the subject of
this conference?
I. EQUAL LEGAL SERVICES FOR EVERY AMERICAN: THE VISION
FOR A GREAT SOCIETY
The language of this conference is a useful starting point for exam-
ining how debates over legal services reflect wider contests over the
welfare state itself. The conference materials speak of legal counsel
for low-income persons as a "service" that is to be "delivered." 1 3 The
questions posed by conference organizers suggest that the default po-
sition in conference deliberations, against which we are considering
proposals for change, is that this service is, or should be, the same for
all persons in society, regardless of their economic wealth or social
status. That language reflects assumptions about the welfare state that
were contested, briefly accepted, and then eroded during the 1960s
and 1970s. In that era of welfare state expansion, legal aid gained at
9. See Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Move-
ment, 1960-1973, at 8-9 (1993) (discussing the growth of AFDC in the 1960s).
10. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 101-913, 110 Stat. 2105, 2105-2355 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of U.S.C.); see also Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of tile
People Some of the Tune: 1990's Welfare Reform and the Ex:ploilation of American
Values, 4 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 3, 72-114 (1996) (criticizing 1990s welfare reform and
arguing that "anti-welfarism has gone much further than before").
11. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103.
12. See id § 104.
13. Indeed, the name of this conference is "The Delivery of Legal Services to
Low-Income Persons: Professional and Ethical Issues."
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least partial acceptance as a welfare state entitlement.' 4 As such, it
was defined as a commodity, like education, housing, health care,
child care, and the like, that was to be "delivered" to low-income per-
sons through a quasi-public state bureaucracy that was funded
through tax transfers.
Thus, the entire system, like the welfare states of those eras, was set
up to further the societal goals of equality and anti-subordination. In
theory, the delivery of legal services to the poor through a govern-
ment bureaucracy would further these two goals in the following ways.
First, to combat wealth inequality, the same minimum quality of serv-
ices would be made available to all citizens, across the income spec-
trum, regardless of ability to pay. Legal services offices would deliver
the same minimum level of legal services as high-end law firms. Sec-
ond, to combat status-based subordination, the legal services delivery
system, unlike traditional law offices, would incorporate the features
of modern bureaucracy that would ensure uniform treatment of per-
sons in spite of their different positions in historical or societal status
hierarchies. Thus, legal services offices incorporated organizational
and consumer-protection features that were more characteristic of
service bureaucracies than traditional law offices.
From its origins, the federally funded Legal Services system that
was put in place during the Great Society era has grappled with two
persistent questions. The bibliography for this conference demon-
strates the centrality of those questions in the debates over legal serv-
ices delivery over the last thirty years.'5 The vocabulary and agenda
of this conference reflects their continuing influence, even as societal
conditions have changed. The first of these questions is how the goal
of providing a high level or quality of services in the interest of cross-
class equality can be reconciled with the dual reality of an overwhelm-
ing need for such services and limited budgets to provide them. The
second of these questions relates to the reliance of the legal services
system on bureaucratic delivery mechanisms, in part as a guard
against invidious, albeit largely unconscious, status-based discrimina-
tion toward socially subordinated clients from the traditional, and
elite, modes of legal practice. How can such bureaucracies guard
against the well-documented organizational dysfunctions that have
plagued such systems, particularly, some will argue, when they are
under the state's command?
These two dilemmas-how to deliver a rich people's level of serv-
ices to poor people without limiting the number of people that you
can serve and how to deliver services flexibly and effectively to poor
communities through the cumbersome apparatus of a welfare bureau-
14. See Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 Geo. L.J.
1529, 1558-82 (1995).
15. See Bibliography to the Conference on The Delivery of Legal Services to Low-
Income Persons: Professional and Ethical Issues, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2731 (1999).
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cracy-produced a rich internal literature in the early period of the
legal services movement. 16 There was extended discussion and debate
within this literature about how to ensure that high (i.e., elite) stan-
dards of "quality" would be delivered to every single client who could
get through a legal services program's screening mechanisms. 17 There
was equally extensive debate about the most rational or equitable
screening systems.' 8 Some focused on enhancing consumer voice
-within the bureaucracy, through "client advisory panels" that helped
to formulate case-selection criteria. 19 Others focused on the criteria
for identifying which cases could have the greatest "impact" on sys-
temic issues that affected large groups of clients. 20 Others explored
arbitrary rules for dividing the case-load among different policy ar-
eas.2 1 There was also debate within the literature that critiqued the
bureaucratic organizational structure of legal services programs.
Some critics, such as Steve Wexler, admonished legal aid lawyers to
leave these offices, and go out into the communities where their cli-
ents lived.' This theme in the early literature saw a resurgence in the
late 1980s, in the spate of articles on the "theoretics of practice," - or
on "rebellious,"24 "political,"'  or "critical lawyering." 26 Finally, there
were proposals to expand the funding base for poor people's legal
services in various ways, such as through IOLTA-funding, private bar
involvement, university/community partnerships, transactional lawy-
ering clinics, and the like, so that the trade-off between maintaining an
elite level of service in each individual case and serving a larger por-
tion of the low-income population would not be so acute.27
16. See id.
17. See Jeanne Kettleson & Gary Bellow, The Politics of Scarcity' in Legal Services
Work, 36 NLADA Briefcase 5, 6 (1979).
18. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Robert G. Meadow, Resource Alloca-
tion in Legal Services: Individual Attorney Decisions in Work Priorities, 5 Law & Pol.
Q. 237, 237-54 (1983) (discussing issues of professional decision-making in legal re-
source allocation).
19. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 1628-29.
20. See Davis, supra note 9, at 58-59, 142.
21. See Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, supra note 18, at 241-42.
22. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale I_. 1049, 1053-
56 (1970).
23. See Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive
Thought and Action, 43 Hastings L.J. 717 (1992).
24. See generally Gerald P. Ldpez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision
of Progressive Lav Practice (1992) (discussing legal strategies to achieve social
change).
25. See Symposium, Political Lawyering Conversation on Progressive Social
Change, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 285 (1996).
26. See Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lawyering: Toward a New Public Interest Prac-
tice, 1 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 49, 49 (1991); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praris: Race
Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 Mich. L
Rev. 821, 873-95 (1997).
27. See, eg., Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, Front Ethics to Politics: Con-
fronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 337, 379-90
(1978) (discussing the conflict lawyers face between the necessary increased subsi-
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II. THE PRESENT ERA
In the current climate, wealth inequalities are becoming more en-
trenched.28 The political will for direct wealth redistribution and gov-
ernment service bureaucracies has eroded.2 9 As a result, the
questions that were posed to legal services in its early decades have
become even more salient. Yet at the same time, these large trends
have greatly undermined any hope of finding adequate resolutions to
those dilemmas in ways that are consistent with the basic premises of
the earlier system. Instead of continuing to take those premises for
granted, we must recognize that the current trends require us to re-
examine those premises themselves, and reconsider what a social wel-
fare system can and should aspire to do in the emerging era.
Thus, rather than continuing to debate the old questions-of how
we can maintain elite levels of service for an exploding universe of
need, or how state bureaucratic legal services delivery systems can be
re-legitimized, expanded, and made more flexible in the current polit-
ical climate-we should re-visit the foundational premises of the
1960s-era legal services movement. This conference is moving in that
direction, albeit with some ambiguity. I think that move should be
made more boldly. That is, we should debate head-on whether or not
the foundational premises of the 1960s-era legal services movement
are normatively and pragmatically optimal for the era into which we
are moving. Is it wise and realistic for us to endorse a uniform level of
legal services delivery (a level that has been elaborated in elite arenas
of law practice), across the current wealth gap? Is endorsing the prin-
ciple of equal (i.e., elite) legal services for all people the best means of
promoting social equality across those divisions? Or rather, in the
context of the present levels of wealth inequality, are we better off
endorsing the idea that the social needs of disfranchised groups should
be addressed sui generis, in ways that reflect their own experiences of
need, their embedded historical and cultural realities, the societal
power landscapes from their perspectives, their capacities, and their
normative aspirations? Is such a normative foundation better than
one which generalizes from elite institutions and practices in the inter-
est of promoting an abstract idea of societal equality?
Some progressive scholars of health care delivery in the context of
global wealth inequality have promoted such a departure. 30 They
challenge the idea that a single normative vision of "equal health
care" across the wealth spectrum is appropriate for current global
dizing of public interest representation and the professional ethics they must work
under).
28. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
29. See supra text accompanying note 8.
30. See generally Women, Poverty, and AIDS: Sex, Drugs and Structural Violence
(Paul Farmer et al. eds., 1996) (collecting essays by various health care experts at-
tempting to reexamine the AIDS issue through the eyes of the poor).
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conditions.3 Rather, they argue that the nature of the health risks
that threaten the survival of poor populations makes such universal
rhetoric inadequate and, indeed, misleading.32 According to these
health care scholars, endorsing a uniform standard of service, even
implicitly, is a bad idea, both as a short-term template for designing
interventions, and as a longer-term normative goal. 3 They assert that
such a notion will fail in the short run because it will not guide prac-
tice, research, and policy to address the urgent health needs of low
income populations.' 4 They also argue that such a notion will fail in
the long term.35 Rather than helping move society toward greater in-
stitutional equality, endorsing a norm of health care service that is
implicitly based on elite practices and institutions will actually perpet-
uate the bifurcated institutional practices that construct and maintain
societal stratification.
One can ask the same kinds of questions in the context of legal
services delivery to low-income persons. One can seek to get below
the questions that the Great Society era's legal services delivery sys-
tem has obsessively generated-questions about the inability to de-
liver high quality legal services to all poor people, or the inadequacy
of bureaucratic delivery systems to meet the needs of poor communi-
ties. One can seek to focus, instead, on the normative premises that
generate those unanswerable questions. One can seek to question
those premises directly. What do we think of a social welfare regime
that promotes equality and anti-subordination by promising, but never
delivering, an elite quality and level of social (and legal) service to
poor people through state bureaucratic arrangements? Is such a vi-
sion optimal for the current age?
Opening up our foundational premises to scrutiny and debate will
not lead us to easy answers. Letting go of the normative goal of a
uniform level of service delivery for all persons will force us to ac-
knowledge the depth of the current trend toward great wealth ine-
quality. Letting go of that goal will force us to focus our practical
know-how, research, and policy on the challenges to survival and well-
being that are faced by those at the bottom. Letting go of that goal
will force us to give up on the illusion that we further, rather than
undermine, social equality by providing an elite level of services to a
select few. At the same time, however, letting go of the goal of a
uniform level of service for all persons carries the message that we
have given up on the struggle for equality, and have resigned our-
selves to living out our lives on an increasingly wealth-divided globe.
31. See id at xiii-xxi
32. See id
33. See id
34. See id.
35. See ih.
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My suggestion, then, is not that we should jettison the normative
vision behind the New Deal/Great Society welfare state. Rather, I
suggest that we surface the normative premises behind that vision and
ask ourselves, as honestly and astutely as we can, whether those are
the best premises on which to ground social welfare in the current age.
